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Couri of Abpjeals of New York.
MILLS el a. Appellants v. PARKHURST, as Assignee,
&c., el al. Respondents.
The doctrine of election between inconsistent remedies does not apply
to creditors who first assail an assignment for the benefit of creditors on
the ground of fraud, and, pending this action, or after its unsuccessful
termination, claim a dividend from the assigned estate.
A creditor may first test the validity of an assignment for the benefit of
creditors, and then make claim for his proportion of the assets after the as-
signment is sustained.
In January, 1884, Henry W. Perine was a member of the
finn of Perine & Co., of New York City, and also of the
firm of H. W. Perine & Co., of Bath, N. Y. On the twenty-
seventh of that month, the New York firm made an
assignment for the benefit of its creditors, and Henry W.
Perine, upon ascertaining the insolvency of the New York
firm, purchased the interests of his partners in the Bath
finn, with agreement to assume and pay the latter firm's
indebtedness. On the thirtieth of January, Henry W.
Perine made an individual assignment for the benefit of
certain preferred creditors, and then for his individual
creditors and the creditors of his New York firm. Reuben
0. Smith, an individual creditor, reduced his claim to judg-
ment after the assignment, and commenced a proceeding to
have the assignment declared void, by reason of the execu-
tion of certain prior mortgages and of the direction in the
assignment to pay individual creditors and the New York
firm's creditors with preference of the former: Smilk v.
Perine (1888), I N. Y. Supp. 495. Only the latter ground
is erroneously stated, by VAN BRUNT, P. J., in Mills el al. v.
Parkhurst et al. (189o), 9 N. Y. Supp. 1O9. This suit was
a failure in the lower courts, as was the case on appeal,
where only the former ground was argued: Smithl v. Perine
el al. (189o), 121 N. Y. 376 and per RUGII, C. J., page 381.
In February, 1886, while this adversary action was pend-
ing, Philo S. Mills and other creditors of Henry W. Perine
began an action for an accounting of the assigned estate,
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and a referee was appointed to state the account. Smith
proved his claim, before the referee, but with notice that he
did not waive any rights exercised in bringing the adver-
sary proceeding, and that his proof of claim was intended
to protect his interest in the fund and to prevent final distri-
bution until the decision of his appeal. On exceptions to
the report of the referee, the allowance of Smith's claim
was held to be erroneous: per O'BRIEN, J., in Special Term
of the Supreme Court for New York County (1889), 5 N. Y.
Supp. 730, 731; and VAN BRUNT, P. J., in General Term
(i89o), 9 N. Y. Supp. io9. The former put the point thus:
No citation of authority is necessary in support of the well-settled
proposition of law, that a creditor who proves his claim under an assign-
ment, and accepts a benefit under it, elects thereby to ratify the assign-
ment, and can never afterwards be heard to attack it, or maintain an
action to set it aside. Is the converse of this proposition good? %Vill a
party who elects not to accept and ratify the assignment, but repudiates
it, and maintains an action to set it aside, be held to have made his elec-
tion, and be precluded from claiming any benefit thereunder?
It is asserted that the reason for the rule in the converse falls, for it is
urged that in the one case the creditor is forbidden to attack an assign-
ment which he has already ratified and confirmed, and under which he
has laid claim to certain rights; in the other, he is asking for that portion
of his claim which his creditor, in the instrument of assignment, has de-
clared himself willing to pay, while seeking to determine whether or not
he be in law entitled to more.
The same learned Judge briefly reviewed Jewelt v. Wood-
ward and Skeryy'eld v. Simonson (infra, pages 354, 356), and
erroneously, according to the Court of Appeals (infr'a, page
342) concluded, that:
While, therefore, the rule as to election, as applicable to voluntary
assignments for the benefit of creditors, is not as sweeping as with respect
to other instruments, as, for example, claims under a contract, as in
Hollerv. Titska (iSSi), 87 N. Y. 166, where the Court laid down the broad
rule that if a man once determined his election, it shall be determined
forever, nevertheless, in the absence of any express authority to the con-
trarv, I am inclined to think that on reason and principle the doctrine of
election should be applied to a case like this, so as to prevent a creditor
from holding at the same time two inconsistent positions, one in main-
taining an action to destroy an instrument which in another action he
seeks to uphold. This is trying to repudiate and ratify at the same time.
Moreover, his hostile action compelled the expenditure of moneys, pre-
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vented the distribution of the estate for a long time, jeopardized the in-
terests of all the other creditors claiming under the assignment, and,
while he could, when presenting his claims, by abandoning his appeal,
have had them allowed, he should be held to his election as standing in
hostility to the assignment, and the exception to the allowance of these
claims should be sustained: O'BRaI9, J., 5 N. Y. Supp. 732-3.
Benjamin S. Harmon, for appellants.
Humblhrey McMasler, for respondents.
GRAY, J., March 20, 1891. The first of the two questions
which were presented, relates to the right of the appellants
to come in and share in the distribution of the assigned
estate, and the argument against their right is, that in bring-
ing and prosecuting the action to set aside the assignment
as fraudulent, they had thereby elected to repudiate the
assignment.
The doctrine of election, which has been thus far success-
fully invoked in support of the argument, does not seem to
be applicable to such a case, and no authority is found war-
ranting its application. The learned Justices who consid-
ered the question at the Special and General Terms, were
influenced in their conclusions by the supposition that these
appellants were pursuing two remedies upon their claims
against their debtor, Perine, and that though direct author-
ity might be wanting upon precisely such a case, Yet analogy
with adjudged cases, which hold that inconsistent remedies
may not be availed of, or concurrently pursued, required the
application of the doctrine of election in this instance. If
the definition of the legal position taken by these appellants
was correctly assumed below, we should have nothing to
say, and could not add to their opinion. But we cannot
agree with them in their view of the situation of the parties.
The elements required to make out a case of election were
wanting. The doctrine of election, usually predicated of
inconsistent remedies, consists in holding the party, to whom
several courses were open for obtaining relief, to his first
election ; where subsequently he attempts to avail himself of
some further and other remedy not consistent with, but con-
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tradictory of, his previous attitude and action upon his
claim. The basis for the application of the doctrine is in
the proposition that where there is, by law or by contract, a
choice between two remedies, which proceed upon opposite
and irreconcilable claims of right, the one taken must ex-
clude and bar the prosecution of the other. An extended
citation of authorities illustrating the principle, in cases of
breaches of contract, or of a duty imposed by the law, would
be unprofitable here, because of many recent decisions of
this Court, and because not needed in the present discussion.
Where parties are under some contract, or the case is one of
a deed or of a will, an election is deemed to be made where
there has been an acceptance of a benefit, under the one or
the other, and the party benefited will not be heard to raise
the question of validity, nor to insist upon some other but
inconsistent legal rights, however well founded. So it is
conceivable that the rule may be so extended as to apply to
the case where a creditor comes in under an assignment by
his debtor for the benefit of creditors, in such way and with
such attitude as should preclude him from thereafter assail-
ing its validity. But how can the converse of the proposi-
tion be sustained? The assignment by an insolvent debtor
is involuntary as to creditors in the application of his assets
to their claims and, it may be, unequal as well as unjust as
to some, and it is of no effect if fraudulently made, within
the meaning of the law. Shall the creditor, for endeavor-
ing to set it aside on legal gi ounds, if unsuccessful, be held
incapable of receiving his share of the debtor's assets?
Such a rule could not be based upon equitable principles. It
would come so near to lending aid and encouragement to
attempts at fraudulent assignments, as to render its adoption
impossible.
The assignment is not like a gift of property upon condi-
tions open to the acceptance or rejection of the donee. It is
a payment by the assignor of his debts after his own plan.
The deed of assignment is in no sense a contract between the
debtor and his creditors, and it does not depend for its valid-
ity in law upon their assent. It is a means or mode which
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the statute permits to be adopted by an insolvent debtor for
the distribution of his estate among his creditors, and so long
a he has acted without fraud, in fact or in law, and has com-
plied with the prescriptions of the act, his conveyance to an
assignee, for the purpose stated therein, will stand and be ef-
fective. If the distribution is to be made unequally among
the creditors, and some are preferred to others in payment,
the assignment is not viewed by the Courts with any favor,
and is only tolerated and upheld when all conditions are met
for the prevention of fraud: Nichols v. McEwenz, 1858, 17
N. Y. 22. The debtor's proceeding sets at naught whatever
elements of superiority the non-preferred creditor's claim may
possess, as it may nullify the results of any diligent effort on
his part to secure his debt. It compels him to submit to in-
equality in payment and to take his firo rata share of the es-
tate, unless he discovers and can establish its invalidity.
But, if he believes himself possessed of proof invalidating the
assignment, he is not debarred from attacking it and en-
deavoring to set it aside. He is then but insisting upon his
general right to be paid his judgment in the order of its
priority; and on what principle should his endeavor in that
direction prevent him from proving and establishing his
right, in any event, to his share in the assigned estate, which
the assignee must be deemed to be holding in trust for him
and all other creditors under the debtor's deed? The creditor
may not feel any more hostility to the debtor's proposed dis-
tribution of his estate, when he sues to annul it, than he did
before. The bringing of the suit is merely the hostility on
his part pronounced in legal proceedings. The learnedJus-
tice delivering the opinion at the General Term conceded
that where an action to set aside the assignment had been
brought, and was unsuccessful and terminated, an election
would not be held to have taken place [szora, page 341].
How does the mere pendency of the action affect and change
the situation? What is the attitude of the parties? The
debtor has transferred his estate to another upon the trust
that he distribute it, in the manner provided in the deed, to
and among his creditors. The assignee is a trustee, whose
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duty it is to make that distribution. A creditor's only al-
ternative, if he is not contented to take what would thus
come to him, is to endeavor to set aside the deed of assign-
ment, if he deems himself possessed of the requisite evidence
of its invalidity at law. If there is any election for him to
make, it can only be with respect to what remedies may be
available to him in order to right himself upon his judg-
ment against the assignor and to avoid the assignment.
We think, therefore, that this was not a case of election of
remedies; and that, in endeavoring to set aside the deed of
assignment in order to render their judgments effective, the
appellants were testing and contesting the legality and valid-
ity of their debtor's act and disputing its binding force upon
them, as they had a legal right to do, and which was a course
that recognized the debtor's deed, but alleged the existence
of grounds for holding it voidable and therefore not com-
pulsory upon the creditor. It in no wise militated against
the right of the appellants, if defeated upon that issue, to
share in the assigned estate on the basis of distribution pro-
vided in the debtor's deed to his assignee.
The second question argued was whether the appellants,
if entitled tp share iu the distribution of the assigned estate,
could claim preference in payment under the assignment, as
being individual creditors of Perine. With respect to that
question, we agree with the decision of the Court below
denying that right. The indebtedness represented by
their claims was clearly excepted by the terms of the deed
of assignment, and they could only claim to share ratably
with other creditors after the payments previously directed.
So much of the judgment appealed from as affirmed the
judgment disallowing the right of these appellants to share
in the distribution of the funds in the assignor's hands should
be reversed and these appellants adjudged entitled to share
with other creditors not preferred in the assignment.
Costs to the appellants, to be paid out of the estate in the
assignee's hands.
All concur.
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Hostility to an assignment may
be manifested either before or after
assent to the provisions of the
trust created for the creditors, and
it will be observed that this recent
New York case involves only the
former class of hostile creditors.
There seems little doubt of the
conclusiveness of assent to an
assignnfent upon any future hostil-
ity. Unfortunately, this conclu-
siveness has been placed on the
ground of election, as in Frierson,
Exr., elal. v. Branch, Exr. (1875),
30 Ark. 453, 457; Adlm v. Yard
(1829), I Rawle (Pa.) 163, though
in case of testamentary disposi-
tions, no person will "be com-
pelled to elect, unless his property
is attempted to be disposed of by
the testator" : Bisph. Eq. 302.
Hostility before assent, does not,
in every forum, prevent abandon-
ment of that hostility and subse-
quent assent to the provisions of
the debtor's assignment for his
creditors. Before discussing this
difference between prior and subse-
quent hostility, it will be advisable
to examine the cases, and the
ostensible principles upon which
they have been decided. It will
also be found possible to classify
the decisions by their facts, and
thus test still further the soundness
of the principles proceeded upon.
Adverse claims against the as-
signed assets.
Several classes of such claims
may be observed, as, A4rst, a claim
founded upon conversion of the
creditor's money into specific prop-
erty. Such was Peters v. Bain
(iS9 o), 133 U. S. 670, decided by
the late ChiefJustice VAITE, in the
Circuit Court for the Eastern Dis-
trict of Virginia. The caseinvolved
the right of a receiver of a National
Bank to claim from an assignee for
the benefit of creditors such prop-
erty as could be specifically proved
as having been purchased with the
Bank's money by the assignors in
default of their duty a. officers of
the Bank, and also the right of the
receiver to come in with the other
creditors upon the balance of the
fund. The Circuit Court allowed
both claims ofthereceiver, and the
Supreme Court, speaking by the
present ChiefJustice, affirmed these
claims, adding, that "The doctrine
of election rdsts upon the principle
that he who seeks equity, must do
it, and means, as the term is ordi-
narily used, that, where two incon-
sistent or alternative rights or
claims are presented to the choice
of a party, by a person who mani-
fests the dear intention that he
should not enjoy both, then he
must accept or reject one or the
other; and so, in other words, that
one cannot take a benefit under an
instrument and then repudiate it.
It cannot be assumed that there
was an intention on the part of
Bain and Brother [the assignors], to
dispose of that which was not
theirs, or, even if they lawfully
could, to cut the Bank off from par-
ticipating in the property assigned,
in the order [of preferencej men-
tioned, by imposing the condition
that the Bank should purchase its
share by parting with its own prop-
erty; nor does any equitable im-
plication to that effect arise. The
other creditors cannot claim com-
pensation for being deprived of
what did not belong to Bain and
Brother, or of anything transferred
in lieu thereof. There existed no
equity on their part which couldbe
held to estop the Bank from receiv-
ing what may come to it under the
assignment, and in doing so, it will
not occupy inconsistent positions.
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That it sought to have the deed set
aside, does not deprive it of its
rights under it, upon the failure of
its attack."
This decision must be dis-
tinguished from the case supposed
by MITCHELL, J., Ini re Van Mor-
man (infra, page 349), where ob-
jection to one provision was
thought to prevent any taking un-
der the assignment. The property
here claimed in preference, was
distinguishable from the other as-
sets, and was so claimed.
Second, a claim founded upon
disregard of the assignment by the
debtor himself, as in the case of the
Appeal of Golden el al. (1885), iO
Pa. 581, which arose from an un-
authorized reconveyance by the
assignee to the assignor, followed
by a creditor's proceeding to have
the trust created by the assignment
enforced, notwithstanding the re-
assignment. The creditor's right
was denied, because she had
attached some of the assets after
the assignment, and thereby (so it
was argued), assented to the re-
assignment. The attachment had
neither been prosecuted nor aban-
doned. But this contention 'was
denied by STERRETT, J., delivering
the opinion of the Court: " Under
the circumstances disclosed by the
record, the issuing and service of
the execution attachment on the
administrators of James E. Browfi
cannot be considered a waiver by
the appellees [the creditor and her
husband] of their right to insist on
the enforcement of the trust. It
was doubtless prompted by the un-
authorized reconveyauce of the
trust property, and resorted to for
the purpose of acquiring a lien on
the fund, in case the reassignment
should be adjudged effective for the
purpose of reinvesting the assignor
with title to the trust property":
Id. 587-8.
Jefferis' and Yearsiey's Appeals
(I859), 33 Pa. 39, cited in Efppright
v. A 'auffman (infra, page 355),
should be observed to prevent an
error. In this Pennsylvania case,
the creditors under a prior assign-
ment claimed a preference over
creditors under a second assign-
ment. Between the two assign-
ments the debtor had become sol-
vent, and had his property re-
assigned without paying these
creditors now claiming a prefer-
ence. This preference was denied,
but no more. "As creditors, they
can claim under the second assign-
ment, but their rights must be
measured by its provisions, and not
by those of the first assignment.
Claiming under one assignment,
they cannot hold the assignee to
duties prescribed by another and a
hostile one": LOWRIE, J., Id. 4o-i.
So that the substance of this case
is merely that creditors can claim
on the fund only through the assign-
ment; they cannot claim froin the
assignee in hostility to the assign-
ment: Geist's Appeal (1884), 104
Pa. 355 and citations. That is, the
creditors "have relinquished noth-
ing in compensation of the bene-
fits of the trust. They have not
agreed to look to it for satisfaction
of their claims. They have no
title to the property assigned. They
acquired a right oniy to enforce the
duty undertaken by the assignees:
BE RCUR, J., Vrighl el aL v. Wig-
ton (1877), 84 Pa. 163, 166 and
citations.
Third, a claim may be prosecuted
against the assigned assets, to ob-
tain a priority not allowed by law
under the assignment. In this
class should be marshalled the New
York case under annotation, and
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a similar case in Minnesota, grow-
ing out of the failure of Van Nor-
man Brothers, of Minneapolis, Min-
nesota. On the last day of Decem-
ber, I883, J. H. Purdy & Co. issued
an attachment out of the State
court against the goods of Van
Norman Brothers and a seizure
was made. During the same day
the defendants made an assignment
to Charles C. Bennett, for the bene-
fit of their creditors, and their as-
signee obtained a surrender of the
possession which had been taken
by the sheriff under the attachment.
Also on the same day, another
creditor, the firm of Lapp & Fler-
shem, issued an attachment from
the United States Circuit Court for
District of Minnesota, and the Mar-
shal proceeded to eject the assignee
and take possession of the assets
under hiswrit: MILLER, J., Dennly
v. Bennett (1888), 128 U. S. 489,
493, though this order of time seems
doubtful: HARLAN, J., Id. 501.
The assignee, upon application,
was allowed to intervene in thislat-
ter attachment, but his motion to
dissolve was refused: Lapp!i v. Van
Norman (884), 19 Fed. Repr. 406.
It was not shown that the assignee
did actually appear in this attach-
ment, which was prosecuted to
judgnent and a sale of the attached
property: MILLER, J., Denny v.
Bennett (1888), 128 U. S. 489, 493,
and MITCHELL, J., In re Van Nor-
man (I889), 41 Minn. 494, 495.
During the pendency ofthis attach-
ment proceeding, the assignee
brought a suit in the State Court
against the United States Marshal,
for the conversion of the attached
goods. A verdict recovered against
the Marshal, was sustained on ap-
peal to the State Supreme Court:
Bennett v. Denny (1885), 33 Minn.
53o, and again on appeal to the
Supreme Court of the United
States: Denny v. Bennett (1888),
128 U. S. 489. Lapp & Flershem
then paid the judgment against the
Marshal and presented their claim
to the assignee for allowance. The
time for presenting their claim
had not expired, and the estate had
not been distributed, so that the
question of time, which was so im-
portant in Lovenberg v. Bank
(infra, page 352), did not arise.
The assignee disallowed the claim,
and in this Was approved by the
State District Court, but the State
Supreme Court, speaking by
MITcHELL, J., thought otherwise,
saying: "It is not pretended that
there is any provision in the insol-
vent law, debarring a creditor from
proving his claim under such cir-
cumstances. Hence, if appellants
are debarred, it nmust be on the
ground that they had elected to
pursue an inconsistent remedy, or
to claim an inconsistent right. It
was exclusively on this ground that
the Court below bases its decision,
and this is the only ground urged
here by the respondent" [the as-
signee]: In re Van Norman (1889),
41 Minn. 494, 495-6.
The Court immediately went to
the foundation of the controversy,
by denying that the doctrine of
election had any application to the
facts of the case. "The appel-
lants never, in fact, had any elec-
tion of rights or remedies. This
action was a mere futile attempt to
assert a right which they never pos-
sessed, in which they were de-
feated and compelled to make res-
titution to the insolvent estate of
what they had wrongfully withheld
from it. If the appellants were
claiming a benefit under one pro-
vision of the assignment, which
was advantageous to them, but ob-
CREDITORS HOSTILE TO ASSIGNMENTS.
jecting to another provision as in-
valid, which was against their
interest, we can see how the famil-
iar principle might apply, that one
who accepts a benefit under an
instrument must adopt it as a
whole, and cannot adopt the part
beneficial to him and reject the
rest [supra, page 3473. Or if the
assignment had been voidable, at
the election of the appellants, * *
Or if the appellants still held the
proceeds of the assigned property,
and the suit against the Marshal
was still pending and undecided,
we can see why this might be good
ground for disallowing their claim,
under the familiar maxim that a
'party cannot blow hot and cold at
the same time' [i/ra, page 351).
Or, again, if the appellants had
prevailed in their [defense of the]
suit against the Marshal, and then
elected to retain the property, and
rely on their attachment, rather
than on the provision made for
them in the assignment, this would
doubtless have amounted to a
waiver and disaffirmauce of the
trust" These dicta are valuable
for comparison with the cases in
the other States, where they have
been uttered as points of decision,
foz the Court proceeded to declare,
under limitation, what should- be
the true rule in all cases; that is:
"But none of the cases supposed,
are at all analogous to the case at
bar, which is simply one where a
party has made a fruitless attempt
to assert a right which he never
possessed, and, being beaten, has
made full restitution and compen-
sation for the wrong which he
committed. The rule is as un-
doubted as it is familiar, that where
a party has inconsistent rights or
remedies, he may claim or resort
to one or the other, at his election,
and that when once made, his elec-
tion is irrevocable. But we think
it is equally true that a mere
attempt to pursue a remedy, or
claim a right, to which a par-ty is
not entitled, and without obtaining
any legal satisfaction therefrom,
will not deprive him of the benefit
of that which he had originally a
right to resort to or claim; and
this proposition, if sound, fully
covers the case."
With reference to an objection
to this principle, which was made
a part of another judicial utter-
ance (inifra, page 35o), the Court
continued: "Considerable stress is
laid upon the supposed injustice of
allowing a creditor who contests
the validity of the assignment, de-
lays the distribution of the estate,
and puts it to the expense of pro-
tracted litigation, when defeated,
to come in and share in the benefit
of the assignment equally with
creditors who have all the time
occupied a friendly attitude. In
view of the policy and purposes of
the insolvent law, it might have
been advisable for the legislature
to have incorporated in it some
provision similar to that attempted
to be applied in this c2se; but they
have not done it, and the courts
have no right to do it. And we
know of no principle of law which
imposes upon a party any other or
greater penalty for attempting to
assert a right to which he is not
entitled, than the judgment for
damages and costs awarded against
him in the action": MITCHEL, J.,
In re VanNorman (I889), 41 Minn.
497. This is a clearer statement of
the underlying principle of the
New York decision here annotated,
than made by that Court, and is
certainly not answered by any of
the cases to be considered later
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(pages 351-352).
Jones v. Tilton (1885), 139 Mass.
418, has been cited (in Drew Glass
Co. v. Baldwin) as establishing the
impossibility of both attacking and
claiming under the assignment;
but this was all erroneous citation,
as the creditors did not lose their
claim upon the assets, though they
endeavored to enforce an attach-
ment issued subsequent to the
assignment. Assent was given to
the assignment after the attach-
meat had ,been issued, and "such
assent, if given before the com-
mencement of an action, would
debar the plaintiffs from making an
attachment, and, being given after-
wards, must defeat the attach-
ment " : C. ALLEN, J., page 420.
Of the cases which declare that a
creditor cannot claim under an as-
signment after opposing or seeking
to invalidate it, Valentine et al. v.
Decker, assignee (1869), 43 Mo.
583, cited in Eppright v. Kauff-
man, (infra, page 355),,was an in-
stance where the plaintiffs had full
notice of the assignment and the
regularity of the proceedings under
it, yet they attached the assets,
and giving bond, ordered their sale
by the Sheriff. The assignee then
commenced suit on-this attachment
bond, and also refused to recognize
the claim of the plaintiffs on the
day appointed for the allowance of'
demands against the estate. The
assignee was upheld in this action,
WAGNER, J., delivering the opin-
ion of the Supreme Court, that
"although a deed be made for a
party's benefit, his assent will be
presumed, still this presumption is
not absolute or conclusive, for the
law will not force a party into a
contract against his will. There-
fore,, he may, if he will, reject or
repudiate an assignment; and he
cannot claim a benefit under it, and
at the same time attack it for fraud
and attempt to destroy its validity.
He must make his election, and
either take under it or disclaim it."
Passing to the safer ground of the
particular case, the Court charac-
terized the action of the plaintiffs
thus: "If they succeed in their
proceeding, they swallow up and
appropriate the assets; but, if they
fail, can they be permitted, after'
having sacrificed the goods, per-
haps at a forced sale, and accumu-
lated costs of their litigation, to
come in on an equality with the
other creditors for a !ro rata share?
The very proposition is monstrous,
and its bare statement carries with
it a sufficient refutation. If such a
course is approbated, it will hold
out inducements to creditors to at-
tach, and, if they are successful,
they will sweep the entire estate, to
the total exclusion of all others; if
not successful, they lose nothing,
for they come in equally with the
others. Such proceedings can meet
with no favor in a court ofjustice ":
Id. 585. This reads savagely be-
sides the temperate judgment of
MITCHELL, J., or the more logical
reasoning of GRAY, J., in the prin-
ciple case (supra, pages '349, 343)-
This principle, however, was sup-
posed to have been followed, in an
"analogous" case, by MARTir, C.,
in Stoller el al. v Coates, assignee
(I885), 88 Mo. 514, 523, where a
claim for a specific sum as a trust
fund was refused because adividend
had been received. This was sup-
posed to be an election which pre-
vented any further claim for trust
funds.
Valentine v. Decker was again
cited in The F. A. Drew Glass Co.
v. Baldwin, by the Kansas City
Court of Appeals, June 6, 1887 (27
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Mo. App. 44), where the attach-
ment had issued the day before the
assignment. The plaintiffs secured
the allowance of their claim upon
the assigned estate, and then under-
took to press their attachment, but
failed by the overruling of their de-
murrer to the assignee's interplea
of the facts just mentioned. PHIL-
LIPS, P. J., delivering the majority
opinion, thought the analogy of a
mortgage creditor valuable, as "It
thus becomes manifest to my mind
that thelaw contemplatesno absurd
results and contingencies in its ad-
ministration. It will not permit a
party to occupy such inconsistent
positions in the prosecution of his
rights. He ought not, with the
judicial sanction, to be allowed to
play with the other creditors the
unequal game of' heads I win, tails
you lose.' [Compare the dicta of
MITCHELL, J., and his subsequent
remarks, sUlpra, pages 348, 349.]
He must either affirm the validity
of the deed in loo, or stand out on
his asserted prior, exclusive right.
His attachment, in the very nature
of the case, is antagonistic to the
assignment. If it stands, there is
nothing for the assignment to oper-
ate on. It is wholly unlike the in-
stance of a prior mortgage or equit-
able lien. There the prior right is
founded on contract-the assent of
the debtor to create the lien ": Id.
51.
E,LISON, J., dissenting, took the
more reasonable though narrow
ground, that the assignment had
been made subject to the attach-
ment, as this had issued the day
before the assignment. Hence,
even if the doctrine of election
could apply, "the time had not yet
arrived at which the defendant
should be compelled to exercise
that right. The doctrine of elec-
tion, though sometimes applied at
law, is of an equitable nature, prin-
cipally exhibited in cases of wills,
and rests, more or less, upon equi-
table principles, and it appears to
me to be unjust and inequitable, to
compel a prior attaching creditor,
to elect between bis attachment
and the assignment, before the
attachment has been passed upon":
27 Mo. App. 61.
This dissent was supported,
among other citations, by the last
resolution of the Court in ANew
England Bank v. Lewis el al.
(ifra, page 356), where the action
involved an attachment on the
assigned goods. WILDB, J., deliv-
ering the opinion, confined him-
self to the case before him, and
pointed out that "It is not, how-
ever, made a condition of the trust
that the plaintifis should discon-
tinue their suit, nor does it appear
that the defendants in that suit,
either expected or wished it to be
done. They insisted on their de-
fense to the action, and eventually
prevailed. Under these circum-
stances, the plaintiffs had a right
to proceed to trial, with the view
of saving themselves from costs.
If they had prevailed in their
action, and had then elected to
rely on the attachment rather than
on the provision made for them in
the deed of trust, this, undoubt-
edly, would have amounted to a
waiver and disaffirmance of the
trust. But merely prosecuting the
action to final judgment, cannot,
we think, have any tendency to
show a waiver of the trust": 8
Pick. (Mass.) 12O-1.
Sampson v. Shaw (1885), T9 Mo.
App. 274, was also decided upon
the authority of Valentine v.
Decker. There, a chattel mortgage
had been made to secure certain
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notes, and on the next day, the
mortgagor executed an assignment
for the benefit of his creditors. The
mortgagee presented a claim to the
assignee, with written notice "that
the validity of said mortgage has
not been tested in the courts, but
will be, and should it be decided in
favor of said Sampson [the mort-
gagee], the above notes will be paid
in full without calling on any funds
in the hands of the assignee; other-
wise he presents said claims to be
allowed and paid as other claims."
This was held to be an election to
claim under the mortgage, though
the mortgagee would be, none the
less, a creditor and a cestui que
trust. This injustice is more es-
pecially to be observed in Douglass
v. Cissna (188 5 ), 17 Mo. App. 44,
where a deed of assignment was
immediately followed byan attach-
ment issued under the erroneous
idea that the deed was void because
preferring on- creditor. The Court
concluded, on a motion for a rear-
gument, that: "It is, therefore,
with little grace that plaintiffs now
complain, if their attachment is not
maintained they will lose all, as
they cannot be admitted to share in
the distribution under the assign-
ment after assailing it," citing
Valentiue v. Decker, and adding
" Duos qui sequitur lepores, neu-
trum capit."
Lovenberg v. Bank (1887), 67
Texas 44o, was a case where the
principles of Valentine v. Decker
were approved, though the exclu-
sion of the attaching creditor was
accomplished by strict construction
of the time within which the claim
could be proved. The circum-
stances were enough to excite the
judicial ire, as the creditor forcibly
removed the assets from the as-
signee's hands and vigorously con-
tested under a chattel mortgage,
void under assignment law, all legal
efforts for their recovery by the as-
signee until finally compelled to
hand over the value of the estate.
After this litigation had terminated,
claim was made upon the assets as
by a consenting creditor. The
Court were also influenced by Ac-
Kindley v. Nourse, assignee (188 5 ),
24 N. W. Repr. 750, where the Su-
preme Court of Iowa had denied
a creditor the right to participate.
The creditor had attempted to re-
scind a sale of goods to the as-
signor, and took them away from
the assignee by a replevin.
Eventually, the assignee won the
replevin suit, and then the creditor
sought to claim under the assign-
ment, upon the plea that the com-
mencement of the replevin was
sufficient notice. This was denied
by SEEvRS, J. "On the contrary,
the plaintiff did not seek payment
of the claim through the assignee or
from the assignment. Thevalidity
of the assignment of the goods re-
plevied was denied, and the plain-
tiff undertook to recover the whole
value of the goods, instead of shar-
ing 'with the other creditors. Hav-
ing taken the chances, and, because
of the choice made, failing to ex-
hibit or file the'claim within the
time required by law, the plaintiff
must abide the consequences."
The cases considered thus far
under this subdivision were caused
by the action of the creditors whose
relation to the assignment was
simply that of creditors. But there
may be action taken against the
assigned assets by a creditor who is
also the trustee in the deed of
assignment. Such was the circum-
stance of Harrison &c. v. Block et
aL. (1846), 1o Ala. 185. It is neces-
sary to observe the exact circum-
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stances of the case, and their re-
cital by ORMIOND, J., in delivering
the opinion of the Court: "The
slaves Hagar, Aaron, Eliza, Nancy
and her child, stand upon a differ-
ent footing. They were sold by
direction of the trustee, in June,
1842, nearly a year after the bill
was filed [against the trustee, for
an execution of the trust by paying
the creditors], to satisfy judgments
which he [the trustee] claimed the
right to control, and at the sale he
became himself the purchaser.
This was a breach of his duty as
trustee. The deed devoted the
slaves and other property to the
payment of all the creditors, in
equal proportions, and he cannot
be permitted to do an act beneficial
to himself, and injurious to the
rest of the creditors, whose inter-
est he had undertaken by the ac-
ceptance of the trust to protect.
The sale being made at his instance,
and for a purpose not authorized
by the deed, is voidable. [The
Court continues, though the facts
are otherwise stated in the report
of the second appeal, in 16 Ala.
619, and also to support an applica-
tion of the doctrine of election, by
ExGIISH, C. J., in Frierson, Exr.
et al. v. Branch, Exr. (1875), 30
Ark. 453,461-] It does not appear
that the executions under which
the sale was made, were liens upon
the slaves when the deed was exe-
cuted ; nor are we able to perceive
that it would alter the case, if such
was the fact. The deed provided
for the payment of all the creditors
ratably, if the property was not
sufficient to pay all, as was the fact
here, and by accepting the trust,
the trustee consented that his own
claim should be thus apporioned.
He, in effect, waived his lien, and
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consented to come in as a general
creditor, except so far as he was
preferred by the deed. * * His
purchase, therefore, of these slaves,
must be considered to have been
made by him in his character of
trustee, and for the benefit of those
concerned in the trust." This reso-
lution was supported by citation
of Hawley v. Afancius (1823), 7
Johris. Ch. (N. Y.) 584, and Rogers
v. Rogers (1825), Hopk. Ch. (N.
Y.) 523, and was followed when the
case came before the State Supreme
Court in 1849: 16 Ala. 616-24.
The former of these two citations
was a similar case, before the dis-
tinguished Chancellor KENT, of
New York. The judgment lien,
however, was against real estate
and prior to the assigment, but the
principle involved was the same;
that is, "to take out an execution
upon the judgment against the
property over which they are exer-
cising a discretion a-.d control as
trustees, would be incompatible
with a due discharge of the trust,
and a manifest breach of it. They
are bound, therefore, to seek for
satisfaction of theirjudgment in the
mode presented by the terms of the
trust which they have accepted":
7Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 185. Itwould
be a blunder to speak of trustees
electing between their office and
their personal advantage, in the
se-se of that doctrine of equity.
The second citation, by Judge OR-
moND, was the case of an executor
who was also a judgment creditor,
and, of course, Chancellor SAND-
FORD applied the proper principle,
in these words: "A trustee can give
no advantage to himself, to the
detriment of those for whom he
holdshistrust. * * * Thisdoc-
trine is undoubted; and ithas often
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been enforced in this Court. Itwas
fully examined by the late Chancel-
lor [KmNT], in the case of Davoue
against Fanning (1&16), 2 Johns.
Ch. (N. Y.) 252. In that case, the
late Chancellor traced the -reasons
of this doctrine and- clearly dis-
played its foundations. [The pres-
ent Chancellor then proceeds to
sum these reasons of KrNT in un-
mistakable language--] This -rule
is founded in the 'most salutary
policy. It justly considers the
trustee, as holding an office not for
his own advantage, but for the bene-
fit of the true owners of the subject
held in trust. The objects of thd
rule are, to secure fidelity on the
part of the trustee, and to preserve
the interests of those whose rights
are confided to his care. To effect
these objects, equity does not in-
quire for fraud on the part of a
trustee who attempts to purchase
the subject of his trust; but it re-
moves temptation, by declaring
him incapable of making a pur-
chase which shall bind those 'for
whom he -is entrusted; and it gives
to them the option to vacate or
affirm the purchase of their trustee,
* * This rule imposes no hard-
ship on the trustee : it prevents col-
lision between his interest and his
duty; and it precludes a difficult
and uncertain inquiry into his mo-
tives. It is necessary for the secur-
ity of those whose property is held
in trust; and it produces practical
and effectual justice":/ Hopk.
Chan. 524-5.
Hence it is not the doctrine of
election at all, which applies to
creditors who assume the duties of
assignees or trustees, but the much
more general rule of fidelity to the
purposes of the trust by the trusted
fiduciary. As a consequence, the
trustee was allowed to share pro
rata with the other creditors: 16
Ala. 616, 623. And these things
are remarkable, as this case was
cited as authority for refusing a
dividend to a creditor who was not
the assignee, and who had merely
pressed a prior attachment before
claiminghis dividend: per PHILIPS,
P. J., in Drew Glass Co. v. Vald-
win (supfra, page 351)." Of course,
the case is not authority for such a
ruling.
Reference is sometimes made in
this connection, to the remarks of
WVAS11INGTON, J., in Prevost v.
Gratz et al. (i16), Peters C. C.
37.3, where he said that "A court of
equity will not permit a person,
acting as a trustee, to create within
himself an interest oprosite to that
of his cesiti que trust or principal.
But this doctrine is inapplicable to
the case of a fair bona fide creditor,
who became so priorto the assump-
tion of his fiduciary capacity. In
such a case, he is entitled to claim
the full amount of -what was due
from his cestui que trust, &c., and
the latter has no right to inquire
how much the former paid for it;
so, too, the trustee &c. 'may pur-
sue all legal remedies for enforcing
payment of the debt, which would
have been open to him if he had
not become a trustee." This lan-
guage was not used in or with re-
gard to the class of cases here con-
sidered, and may be passed with-
out further remark than that no
hostile or destructive action towards
the trust is supposed. Such rights
as existed prior to the assignment,
still remain, though their owner
has become the assignee or trustee.
Fourth, the creditors may attempt
to repudiate the assignment, as
they did in Jewett v. Woodward
(1831), x Edw. Chan. (N. Y.) 195.
Vice-Chancellor McCOwN thought
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that "This seems to have been an
unnecessary and rather a vexatious
proceeding; but I do not perceive
how the creditors, by so doing, de-
prived themselves of a right to
come in and claim under the assign-
mehit, provided the proceedings
proved unavailing, or they thought
proper to abandon them. The
doctrine of election does not apply
to a case like the present, where
the question is merely as to the
remedy or mode of proceeding. If
one remedy fails, the party may
oftentimes resort to another. Noth-
ing is more common than to leave
a party to his bill in equity, after a
fruitless attempt at law; and, vice
versa. I am of opinion there has
been no waiver or abandonment of
the right to come in under the
assignment and ask for a distribu-
tion of the trust funds." In the
case under annotation, the Judge
at the Special Term thought these
sentiments to have a restricted ap-
plication to cases when the creditors
had abandoned their adverse pro-
ceedings (supra, page 341).
Attack on assets not assigned.
Eppright v. Kauffman (1886), 9o
Mo. 25, was a case where the cred-
itor claimed under the assignment,
and also attacked what he supposed
to be assets of the assignor which
had not passed to the assignee.
The case reached the State Supreme
Court on account of the refusal of
the assignee to pay the dividend
awarded to the creditor, upon the
mistaken impression that the cred-
itor's adverse action had forfeited
his right to the dividend. SHER-
WOOD, J., delivering the opinion of
the Court, noticed Valentine v.
Decker, and Jefferis' Appeal (sui ra,
pages 350, 347), and added: "But
I have found no case going to the
length of saying that where, as
here, the claim of the creditor has
passed in remjudicatam, his rights
therein or thereto can be effected or
overthrown in consequence of his
subsequently recovering judgment
for the amount of his allowed
claim, and then attempting, by
legal proceedings, to have that
judgment satisfied out of what, at
the time, were not considered as
passing as assets into the hands of
the assignee by reason of the assign-
ment." The authority of this case
cannot be extended beyond its
facts, as the Court was unfortunate
enough to add, that: "There is a
wide difference, I take it, between
a direct attack upon an assignment
as for fraud, etc., and acasewhere a
claim is presented and allowed be-
fore the assignee, and the claimant
afterwards endeavors, by legal
measures, to reach such assets as
seemed to be beyond the reach of
the assignee. There is certainly a
distinction to be taken between
direct attack and mere inad-
vertence": Id. 29. This language
is weighty, as the decision has
since been cited as authority for
the proposition that the assignee's
action in allowing or refusing a
claim, is a judgment, conclusive
and appealable from as other judg-
ments, by SHERWOOD, J., Nanson
v. Jacob (1887), 93 Mo. 331, 344,
and NORTON, C. J., Roan v. Winn,
Id. 503, 512.
Adverseproceedings against the
debtor.
Such proceedings have been con-
sidered as affording no reason for
excluding the creditor from partici-
pation in the assigned assets.
Generally speaking, a judgment
against the debtor, obtained even
after the assignment, unless by col-
lusion, will serve to fix the exact
amount of the claim, and ought not
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to diminish the rights of the cred-
itor. To. -this, several objections
have been raised: thus,first, it is
said that the judgment has merged
the claim, and so merged it that the
right to prove under the assign-
ment is cut off by reason of the
judgment being a demand arising
subsequent to the assignment.
This contention was denied in The
Second NVational Bank of Rich-
inondv. Townsend, assignee (I888),
114 Ind. 534, where the Court below
excluded a judgment, as well asthe
notes on which it was founded,
from participation in the assets of
an assigned estate. This was re-
versed, on appeal, because " Equity
always refuses to permit a merger
where it will work injustice. In
this instance, this equitable prin-
ciple should be applied. The act
of the creditor, in reducing his
claim to judgment, neither preju-
diced the rights of any other cred-
itor, nor interfered with the admin-
istration of the trust. The debt re-
mains ; the evidence is, it is true,
changed into a new and higher
form, but the appellant is still a
creditor. * * * Equity looks
through form to substance, and the
substance to which it will- here
look, is that the appellant was a
creditor when the assignment was
made, and continued a creditor, al-
though the form of the evidence of
his debt was changed. * * *
We hold that, although the notes
were merged as a causd of action,
an incidental right, such as the
right to share in the trust funds in
the hands of the assignee, was not
even technically merged in the
judgment. Incidental rights and
equities of that nature were not
litigated, and were not concluded by
the judgment, and there can, there-
fore, he no merger ": ELLIOTT, J.,
Id. 536-7.
Second, it was thought by the as-
signees, as early as i829,'in New
England Bank v. Lewis et al., 8
Pick. (Mass.) 113, 117, that the
prosecution of the action was a re-
jection of the assignment, and,
therefore, a claim presented to the
assignees, subsequent to judgment,
could be met with the old plea of a
former recovery. This was denied,
though the decision of the Supreme
Judicial Court was closely confined
to the facts before them, and these
facts were peculiar in that the judg-
ment set up in bar was adverse to
the plaintiffs on the mere ground of
suit before cause of action accrued:
New England Bank v. Lewis et al.
(1824), 2 Pick. (lass.) 125. Hence
the judgment was f"no bar, either
at law or in equity": WILDE, J.,
-8 Pick. (Mass.) 118.
New York Cases.
After the repudiation by the
Court of Appeals, of any application
- of the doctrine of election to actions
by creditors against the assigned
assets, two cases in the inferior
courts of New York become of little
future value beyond their historical
position as having preceded the
final declaration of the law in that
,State. One of these cases is Stern-
feld v. Simonson (1887), 44 Hun.
(N. Y.) 429, from which O'BRinm,
J., in the Supreme Court stage of
the principal case (vide, supra, page
341) drew the inference that if the
action hostile to the assignment
there taken, had been pending in-
stead of fruitlessly ended, the un-
successful creditor could not have
claimed on the assigned estate and
brought his action against the
bondsmen of the assignee. But
this inference is not properly
drawn, as the case fell within the
second of the two classes dis-
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tinguisbed in this annotation
(sup ra, page 346). "In fact, long
before the issuing of the attach-
ment, the plaintiffs had elected to
proceed under the assignment, and
their proceedings to examine the
assignor and assignee, in regard to
the property, and in respect to the
amount ofthe bond which it would
be proper for the assignee to give
in the Court of Common Pleas,
might have been a complete answer
to their proceeding by attachment,
upon the allegation that the assign-
ment was made with intent to hin-
der, delay and defraud the cred-
itors, as they had elected to assert
rights under the assignment itself,
and after having made such elec-
tion, they could not attack it upon
the ground offraud": VAN BRUNT,
P. J., 44 Hun. 432.
Iselin v. Henlein (1885), 16 Abb.
New Cases (N. Y.) 73, probably
caused the judgments in the court
below in the principal case, though,
curiously enough, it is not cited.
This case was cited by VAx BRUNT,
P. J., in Sternfeld v. Simonson, but
merely to distinguish it. In this
Iselin case, the defense was, in
part, acquiescence in the assign-
ment arising out of a compromise
proposed after the assignment.
This compromise was not carried
out within the time fixed by the
plaintiffs for giving their assent to
it. After the expiration of the time
so fixed, the plaintiffs, in January,
1884, issued an attachment against
the assigned assets, on the ground
of fraud, and their attachment was
held to be valid: Viclorv. Henlein
(1885), 7. N. Y. Civ. Proc. 69.
"The plaintlffs, in August, 1884,
proved their debt and filed the
same with the assignee. But they
annexed to their proof, a statement
that they did not thereby waive
any rights they may have acquired
under their attachment, and they
added, 'nor do we recognize in any
manner, the validity of said general
assignment, unless the same is held
to be valid and binding against
Us"': VAN VOR , J., 16 Abb. New
Cases (N. Y.) Si. This action was
similar to that of the creditor in
Sampson v. Shaw (supra, page
352), and the New York Judge de-
dared "the intentional qualifica-
tion," was no admission of the
validity of the assignment. The
action, therefore, proceeded and the
assignment was declared void.
Judge VAN VCRST apparently de-
cided the case upon the absence of
an equitable estoppel, the creditor
not misleading and the assignee
not being misled by the claim on
the assets. And this seems farmore
reasonable than speaking of an elec-
tion between contrary rights or
remedies, when it is not the remedy
chosen by the hostile creditor or
the right asserted, but his accept-
ance of the assignment, that is the
test. Those cases which proceed
upon the test of an election, vir-
tually put a premium upon fraudu-
lent assignments by excluding an
attacking creditor from all partici-
pation in the assets. Every cred-
itor, in the jurisdictions where this
principle prevails, is put to an
"election" between proving or
submitting to a fraud ; and this be-
cause some creditors have failed to
established a fraud which did not
exist. Thus the greater evil is
there preferred over the lesser.
The discussion of the difference
between assent to an assignment
before testing its validity, and as-
sent after such legal scrutiny, will
not now appear to rise from a mere
question of priority of action or as-
sent, but from a general principle
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involved in the assent of the creditor ity undertaken. Such consideration
to a voluntary assignment. This must be postoned to a subsequent
larger discussion involves also a con- page of this magazine.
sideration of the cases where assent JOHN B. UHLE.
has first been given, and then hostil-
NOTE.-It is a curious fact that
Adams, in his book on Equity, treats
of the doctrine of election as if it was
confined to wills. He says: "It has
been stated as a general principle
that the equity to enforce contracts
made for value, is extended by parity
of reasoning to cases where a benefit
has been conferred as the considera-
tion for an act, and knowingly accept-
ed, although the party so accepting it
may be bound by an actual contract,
or by a condition of perfomance an-
nexed to the gift. (Edwards v. Grand
.7unction Railway, i Al. & C., 65o;
Green v. Green, 59 Ves. 665; 2
Meriv., 86; Gretton v. Haward, i
Swanst. 409, 427.) The equity of
election is analagous to this. It ap-
plies not to cases of contracts or of
conditional gifts, but to those on
which the donor of the interest by
will has tacitly annexed a deposition
to his bounty, which can only be
effected by the donor's assent, e. g.,
where a testator. leaves a portion of
iis property to A, and by the same
will disp -ses of property belonging to
A." (P. 92.) There ia, not a word
concerning any other kind of election.
Mr. Bispham in his work on Equity
(Section 295) gives a clear state-
ment of the doctrine of election. He
says: "An election in equity is a
choice which a party is compelled to
makebetween the acceptance of a ben-
efit under an instrument, and the
retention of some property already
his own, which is attempted to be dis-
posed of in favor of a third party by
virtue of the same instrument. The
doctrine rests upon the principal that
a person claiming under an instru-
ment shall not interfere by title para-
mount, to prevent another part of the
same instrument from having effect
according to its construction; he can-
not accept and reject the same instru-
ment. Streafield v. Streafield, I
Lead Cases, Eq. 333, and notes: Cod-
rington v. Lindsay, L. R. Ch. App.
578; Stepihens v.Stephlens, 3 Drew, 697,
701 ; Hall v. Iall, I Bland, x3o; Clay
v. Hart, 7 Dana i ; Brown v. Rickets,
3 Johns Ch. 553 ; Marriott v. Sam
Badger, 5 Maryl. 3o6; Van Dnj'ne v.
Van Dnyne, I McCart, 49; Gable
v. Daub, 4 Wright (Pa.) 217; Reaves
v. Garrett, 34 Ala., 558; Brown v.
Pitney, 39 Ill. 468. It is a doctrine
which is principally exhibited in
cases of wills ; but it has been applied,
also, to cases of voluntary deeds
for value resting upon articles, to
cases of contracts completely execut-
ed by conveyance and assignment.
Codringon v. Lindsay, L. R. 8 Ch.
App. 587; Anderson v. Abbot, 23
Beav. 457; Brown v. Brown, L. R. 2
Eq. 481 ; WVilloughby v. Middle/on, 2
Johns and H. 344.
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Szreme Court of the United States.
DUNCAN v. McCALL, Sheriff.
Where a petitioner to a Circuit Court of the United States, prays for a
habeas corpus, under the Fourteenth Amendment, upon the ground that
certain State Statutes were not legally enacted, and it appears that the
State court has jurisdiction and is exercising it over the petitioner, the pe-
tition should be denied and the petitioner put to his writ of error.
Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for
the Western District of Texas.
Thos. j Mcfinn, A. H. Garland. and Heberi MOfa, for
appellant.
R. H. Harrison, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
FULLER, C. J., March 30, r891. Dick Duncan was in-
dicted by the Grand Jury of Maverick County, Texas, for
the crime of murder, and, having been arraigned, was tried
in the District Court of that County and State, found guilty,
and his punishment assessed at death, and the Court entered
judgment accordingly, from which he appealed to the Court
of Appeals. He was thereupon committed to the jail of
Bexar County, upon the ground that there was no safe jail
in Maverick County, McCall, the appellee here, being Sheriff
of Bexar County at the time. While the case was pending
on appeal, and on the tenth of April, 189o, Duncan filed in
the Circuit Court of the United States for the Western Dis-
trict of Texas his petition for a writ of habeas corfius, to be
discharged from custody, on the ground that he was deprived
of his liberty and about to be deprived of his life in viola-
tion of the Constitution of the United States.
The petition set forth the finding of four indictments for
murder against petitioner, his arrest, trial, conviction, and
sentence, and copies of the record were attached. It was
alleged that petitioner was deprived of his liberty without
due process of law, and denied the equal protection of the
laws, because the "Penal Code and Code of Criminal Pro-
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cedure" of the State of Texas, now and since July 24, 1879,
recognized as law, under which his alleged trial was con-
ducted, were not enacted by the Legislature of the State of
Texas, and that the definitions and rules in the supposed
Codes were materially different from the definitions and
rules of procedure prevailing before their alleged adoption.
The petition then averred that the Codes failed of enactment
on these grounds, in substance: That the bill which con-
tained them was not referred to a committee and reported on
in the House, and was not read on three several days in each
House, as required by the State Constitution; and although
the Legislature dispensed with the reading of the printed
matter in extenso, and provided for a consideration on three
several days, the bill was not so considered; that the two
Houses of the Legislature never agreed to or came to a com-
mon legislative intent on the passage of the bill; that
neither House of the Legislature kept a journal of its pro-
ceedings, as required; that an abortive attempt was made to
dispense with enrollment, and there was no enrollment of
the bill, or any substitute therefor; that there is no record
in existence by which the accuracy of said statutes can be
verified; that the Legislature attempted to delegate legislative
power to one Lyle, who proceeded to embody the alleged
Codes into a printed book, the volume known as the "Re-
vised Statutes of Texas"; that the said volume is not a
copy of or identical with the bill said to have been passed
embodying them, but is widely variant therefrom, and from
the original bill on file in the office of the Secretary of State;
that the alleged law set out in the Revised Statutes was
never considered or passed by the Legislature of the State,
nor considered by the Governor, and did not become a law;
that the printing, binding, distribution, and codification of
the volume known as the "Revised Statutes" was never
duly or legally authorized, and that the entire 'system of
penal and civil laws is involved.
It was further alleged that the Court of Appeals of Texas
was organized on the sixth of May, 1876, and that the
judges selected to sit upon the bench of that Court were
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
elected on the third Tuesday in February, prior to the organ-
ization of the Court; that the present presiding judge of
the Court was at that time elected, and has since continuously
succeeded himself; that the Court is interested in the deter-
mination of the questions involved, because the statutes
supposed to have been adopted, attempted to make new and
important provisions for the exercise of jurisdiction and
judicial power by the Court, and the civil statutes, which
fixed the salaries of judges, determined the jurisdiction of
certain judicial districts, and regulated the method of elec-
tion of judges in the State, were attempted to be enacted at
the same time and mainly in the same manner as above set
forth; that a decision by any 'court of Texas upon the
questions presented would tend to disturb the alleged and
recognized legal system and Code of laws of said State, and
cloud the title to office of the judges of the State, and sub-
ject the courts to severe criticism, and that petitioner has
cause to fear that the courts of Texas would be unduly
influenced to his prejudice.
The differences between the prior statutes and codes and
those of 1879, which petitioner claimed operated to abridge
his rights, privileges, and immunities as a citizen of the
United States, and to deprive him of due process of law,
seem, as he sets them up, to be that, by the prior law, the
punishment of murder in the first degree was death, and the
jury could not assess the punishment, so that imprisonment
could not be inflicted if the crime were of that degree,
whereas this could be done under the later law; that, by the
prior law, grand juries were composed of not less than six-
teen persons, while by the later, twelve was the number,
though this was prescribed by Section 13, Article V, of the
Constitution; that challenges to the array were allowed
under the prior law for corruption in the summoning officer,
and the willful summoning of jurors with the view of secur-
ing conviction, whereas, under the later law, while the jurors
called upon the trial had been selected by jury commissioners
in accordance with a law to that effect enacted in 1876, the
challenge to the array was not allowed, but it was not
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averred that petititioner attempted to challenge the array;
that under the prior law the indictment must charge the
offense to have been "felonious" or done "feloniously,"
whereas, under the Codes of 1879, these words might be
omitted, as they were in this instance; and that, under the
prior law, sheriffs were prohibited from summoning any
person as a juror found within the court house or yard, if
jurors could be found elsewhere, but that some of the jurors
who tried him were so summoned, although, other jurors
could have been found in the county.
The Sheriff of Bexar County filed exceptions to the juris-
diction of the Circuit Court, and assigned, among other
reasons, that the petition showed upon its face that the mat-
ters in controversy did not arise under the Constitution,
laws, or treaties of the United States, nor did the adjudica-
tion or determination of the same involve a construction
thereof, but that the matters arose solely under the Constitu-
tion and laws of the State of Texas, and their determination
involved exclusively the construction of the State Constitu-
tion and laws ; that it did not appear from the petition that
petitioner was restrained of his liberty and illegally held in
custody for an act done or omitted in pursuance of a law of
the United States, or of an order, process, or decree of a
court thereof, or that he was in custody in violation of the
Constitution or of a law or treaty of the United States; and
that the Circuit Court had no power or jurisdiction to re-
lease petitioner from custody, inasmuch as he was held by a
duly authorized and qualified officer of the State, under and
by virtue of a judgment of a court of the State, in and by
which he had been tried, convicted, and adjudged guilty of
a crime against the laws of the State, as appeared from the
facts set forth in the petition. And the respondent further
excepted, upon the ground that the petition was wholly in-
adequate and insufficient to authorize the relief sought,
because it appeared from its allegations that the petitioner
was arrested upon an indictment charging him with the
commission of the crime of murder, in violation of the
laws of the State; that he was arraigned and duly tried and
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convicted of the crime as charged, and was by the court, in
accordance with the verdict, sentenced, and was now held to
await the execution of that sentence, unless reversed by the
Court of Appeals of Texas, wherein the case is now pend-
ing on appeal from the court below; and that even if the
validity of the present Penal Code and Code of Criminal
Procedure of Texas were legitimately assailed, yet the peti-
tion was wholly insufficient, because there was no allegation
that the provisions of the old Code, which in such an event
would have remained in force, were in the least dissimilar
from the present, or that he would have been tried in a
different way, or that he would have or might have received
a different or lesser punishment.
May 14, 189o, the Circuit Court, on hearing the applica-
tion, dismissed the petition and denied the writ. From that
judgment petitioner appealed to this court.
By Section I, Article V, of the Constitution of Texas, the
judicial power of the State was vested "in one Supreme
Court, in a Court of Appeals, in District Courts, in County
Courts, in Commissioners' Courts, in courts of Justices of
the Peace, and in such other courts as may be established by
law." By Section 3, the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
was confined to civil cases; by Section 6, it was provided
that "the Court of Appeals shall have appellate jurisdiction,
co-extensive with the limits of the State, in all criminal
cases of whatever grade;" and by Section 8, that "the
District Courts shall have original jurisdiction in criminal
cases of the grade of felony." The District Court of Maver-
ick County was created and organized by an act of the
Legislature of Texas approved March 25, 1887: Laws Tex.
1887, p. 46. It had jurisdiction to try the offense of which
petitioner was accused, and acquired jurisdiction over his
person and the offense charged against him, through the in-
dictment and his arraignment thereon. He was charged
with the commission of the crime of murder, which lie did
not deny was a crime against the laws of Texas, and that
the penalty therefor was death. What he complained of in
his application to the Circuit Court was that in the matter
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of indictment and trial he had been subjected to the pro-
visions of statutes which had not been enacted in accordance
with the State Constitution. The District Court had juris-
diction and the power to determine the law applicable to
the case, and, if it committed error in its action, the remedy
of petitioner was that of which he availed himself, namely,
an appeal to the Court of Appeals of the State. Under
these circumstances, the Circuit Court properly declined to
interfere: ExParte Royall (1886), 117 U. S. 241, 245, 255;
Exfiarte Faida (1886), 117 U. S. 516.
Nor does the contention of counsel iii respect to the
Court of Appeals justify any other conclusion. Under
Sections 5 and 6 of Article V of the State Constitution, the
Court of Appeals was created as a court of last resort in
criminal matters, its powers and jurisdiction defined, and
the salary, tenure of office, and qualifications of its judges
prescribed. The determination of the validity or invalidity
of the Civil or Penal Codes of 1879 would in no respect
affect that Court in these particulars, if the extraordinary
claim of counsel in this regard wele entitled to any con-
sideration whatever in this proceeding. Unquestionably it
is a fundamental principle that no man shall be judge in his
own case, and the Constitution of Texas forbids any judge
to sit in any case wherein he may be interested, or where
either of the parties may be connected with him by affinity
or consanguinity within such degree as may be prescribed
by law, or wheie he shall have been counsel in the case; and
specific provision is made for commissioning persons to hear
and determine any case or cases in place of members of the
Supreme Court or Appellate Court, who may be therein
thus disqualified: Cost, Article V, § xi. But no such ques-
tion arises, or could arise, upon this record.
The Constitution of the State of Texas was submitted by
the Convention which framed it to a vote of the people, on
the third Tuesday of February, 1876, for their ratification or
rejection, by an ordinance passed for that purpose; and it
was provided that, if ratified, it should become the organic
and fundamental law of the State on the third Tuesday of
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April following; and also that, at the same time that the vote
was taken upon the Constitution, there should be a general
election held throughout the State for all State, district,
county and precinct officers created and made elective by the
instrument; and that, if the Constitution were ratified, cer-
tificates of election should be issued to the persons chosen:
Jour. Const. Con. 772, 78o. The Constitution was ratified,
and the petition alleged that the judges of the Court of
Appeals were elected to their positions on the third Tuesday
in February, 1876, and that the Court of Appeals was organ-
ized on the sixth of May of that year, from which counsel
argues that the conclusion should be drawn that the present
members of that Court are not even officers defacto. The
suggestion requires no observation here.
We repeat that, as the District Court had jurisdiction
over the person of the petitioner and the offense with which
he stood charged, it had jurisdiction to determine the appli-
catory law, and this involved the determination of whether
particular statutory provisions were applicable or not, and
hence, if the question were properly raised, whether a par-
ticular statute or statutes had been enacted in accordance
with the requirements of the State Constitution.
It is unnecessary to enter upon an examination of the rul-
ing in the different States upon the question whether a
statute duly authenticated, approved, and enrolled can be
impeached by resort to the journals of the Legislature, or
other evidence, for the purpose of establishing that it was
not passed in the manner prescribed by the State Constitu-
tion. The decisions are numerous, and the results reached
fail of uniformity. The courts of the United States neces-
sarily adopt the adjudication of the State courts on the sub-
ject: Town of Soutk Ottawa v. Perkins (1877), 4 Otto (94
U. S.) 260; Post v. Supervaisors (1882), 15 Otto (1O5 U. S.)
667; Railroad Co. v. Georgia (1879), 8 Otto (98 U. S.)
359. In Town of South Ottawa v. Perkins, where the exist-
ence of a statute of Illinois was drawn in question, Mr. Jus-
tice BRADLEY, delivering the opinion of the Court, said (94
U. S. 268):
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As a matter of propriety and right, the decision of the State courts on the
question as to what are the laws of a State is binding upon those of the
United States. But the law under consideration has been passed upon by
the Supreme Court of Illinois, and held to be invalid. This ought to have
been sufficient to have governed the action of the court below. In our
judgment it was not necessary to have raised an issue on the subject, ex-.
cept by demurrer to the declaration. The court is bound to know the law
without taking the advice of a jury on the subject. When once it became
the settled construction of the Constitution of Illinois that no act can be
deemed a valid law unless, by the journals of the Legislature, it appears to
have been regularly passed by both Houses, it became the duty of the
courts to take judicial notice of the journal entries in that regard. The
courts of Illinois may decline to take that trouble, unless parties bring the
matter to their attention ; but, on general principles, the question as to
the existence of a law is a judicial one, and must be so regarded by the
courts of the United States. This subject was fully discussed in Gardner
v. Collector. After examining the authorities, the Court in that case lays
down this general conclusion : "That whenever a question arises in a
court of law of the existence of a statute, or of the time when a statute
took effect, or of the precise terms of a statute, the judges who are called
upon to decide it have a right to resort to any source of information which
in its nature is capable of conveying to the judicial mind a clear and satis-
factory answer to such questions ; always seeking, first, for that which in
its nature is most appropriate, unless the positive law has enacted a differ-
ent rule" : (1868), 6 Wall. (73 U. S.) 511. Ofcourse, anyparticularState
may, by its Constitution and laws, prescribe what shall be conclusive evi-
dence of the existence or non-existence of a statute; but, the question of
such existence or non-existence being a judicial one in its nature, the
mode of ascertaining and using that evidence must rest in the sound dis-
cretion of the court on which the duty in any particular case is imposed.
And it has been often held by State courts that evidence
of the contents of legislative journals, which has not been
produced and made part of the case in the court below, will
not be considered on appeal: Railroad Co. v. Wren (1867),
43 Il. 77 ; Bedard v. Hall (i866), 44 Id. 91 ; Grob v. Cash-
man (1867), 45 Id. ii; Hensoldl v. Petersburg (1872), 63
Id. 157; Auditor v. Haycrafi (1878), 14 Bush. (Ky.) 284;
Bradey v. West (1875), 6o Mo. 33; Coleman v. Dobbins
(1856), 8 Ind. 156.
The distinction is recognized between matters of which
the Court -will take judicial cognizance "immediately, suo
motu," and those which it will not notice "until its attention
has been formally called to them ": Gres. Eq. Ev. (2 ed.)
*395, *408. As to the last, Mr. Gresley says:
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It will not point out their applicability nor call for them, but if they are
once put in by either party it will investigate them, and will bring its own
judicial knowledge to supply or assist their proof, and will then adopt
them as its own evidence, independently of the parties.
Jon1es v. U. S. (1890), 137 U. S. 202, 216.
As a statute duly certified is presumed to have been duly
passed until the contrary appears (a presumption arising in
favor of the law as printed by authority, and, in a higher de-
gree, of the original on file in the proper repository), it would
seem to follow that wherever a suit comes to issue, whether
in the court below or the higher tribunal, an objection rest-
ing upon the failure of the legislature to comply with the
provisions of the Constitution should be so presented that
the adverse party may have opportunity to controvert the
allegations, and to prove by the record due conformity with
the constitutional requirements: Peoble v. Sziperisors
(1853), 8 N. Y. 325.
By the Constitution of Texas, each House of the Legisla-
ture must keep a journal of its proceedings, and publish the
same, and the yeas and nays of either House on any question
shall, at the desire of three members present, be entered on
the journals (Article III, § 12); no law shall be passed except
by bill, and no bill shall have the force of law until it has
been read on three successive days in each House, and free
discussion allowed thereon, but in case of imperative public
necessity (which necessity shall be stated in a preamble or
the body of the bill), four-fifths of the House in which the
bill may be pending may suspend this rule, the yeas and
nays being taken on the question of suspension, and entered
upon the journal (Sections 30,32); no bill shall be considered
unless it has first been referred to a committee and reported
thereon; and no bill shall be passed which has not been
presented, referred, and reported at least three days before
final adjournment (Section 37); the presiding officer of each
House shall, in the presence of the House over which he pre-
sides, sign all bills, and the fact of signing shall be entered
on the journals (Section 38); no law passed by the Legisla-
tare, except the general appropriation act, shall take effect
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or go into force until ninety days after the adjournment of
the session at which it was enacted, unless in case of an
emergency the Legislature by a vote of two-thirds otherwise
direct, said vote to be taken by yeas and nays and entered
upon the journals, and the emergency to be expressed in a
preamble or the body of the act (Section 39). By the law
prior to 1876, the journals of the respective Houses were re-
quired to be furnished to the public printer, for the purpose
of being printed, by the clerical officers of each House (Pasch.
Dig. Art. 4872); and the Secretary of State was required to
distribute the printed journals (Id. Art. 5b92); and similar
provision was made by the Act of June 27, 1876 (Laws Tex.
1876, p. 36), as also by the Revised Statutes of 1879 (Rev.
St p. 677, §4012, et seq.). When printed, the manuscript
journals were to be returned and filed in the archives of the'
Legislature (Pasch. Dig. Art. 4872; Laws. Tex. 1876, p. 36).
It was the duty of the Secretary of State to keep, publish,
and distribute the laws (Pasch. Dig. Arts. 5091, 5092, 4872,
et seq.; Laws Tex. 1876, pp. 35, 313 ; Rev. St. 1879, pp.
395, 577, §2722, et seq.).
The Revised Statutes of Texas, containing the Code in
question, were officially published in 1879, with the certifi-
cate of the Secretary of State as to the date when the law
enacting them went into effect, and that the volume was a
true and correct copy of the original bills on file in his de-
partment. For eleven years prior to the conviction of
Duncan, these Codes had been recognized and observed by
the people of Texas; had been amended by the Legislature,
and republished under its authority; and their provisions
had been repeatedly construed and enforced by the courts as
the law of the land. In Usener v. Slate (i88o), 8 Tex. App.
177, the validity of the Penal Code in respect of its adop-
tion by the Legislature was passed upon and the law upheld;
and that case was quoted with approval in Exfjarle Ti'tou,
28 Tex. App. 438, a decision rendered as late as February,
189o. This decision ruled that an authenticated statute
should be regarded as the best evidence that the required
formalities were observed in its passage, and that the courts
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would not exercise the power of going behind it and inquir-
ing into the manner of its enactment; and Blessing v. Gal-
veston (1875), 42 Tex. 641; Railway Co. v. HIearne (I87O),
32 Id. 547, and Day Land, etc., Co. v. State (1887), 68 Id.
526, were cited in support of the proposition. In one of
these cases, it was decided that the judicial department
should not disregard and treat as a nullity an act of the
Legislature, because the journals of one or both Houses
failed to show the passage of the bill in strict conformity
with all the directions contained in the Constitution; and in
another, that it would be conclusively presumed that a bill
had been referred to a committee, and reported on before its
passage, as required by the Constitution. The language of
the Court in State v. Szw /t (1875), 1o Nev. 176, was quoted
approvingly in Usener v. State, and repeated in Ex iarte
Tiflton:
Where an act has been passed by the Legislature, signed by the proper
officers of each House, approved by the Governor, and filed in the office of
the Secretary of State, it constitutes a record which is conclusive evidence
of the passage of the act as enrolled. Neither the journals kept by the
Legislature, nor the bill as originally introduced, nor the amendments
attached to it, nor parol evidence, can be received in order to show that
an act of the Legislature, properly enrolled, authenticated, and deposited
with the Secretary of State, did not become a law. This Court, for the
purpose of informing itself of the existence or terms of a law, cannot
look beyond the enrolled act, certified to by those officers who are
charged by the Constitution with the duty of certifying and with the duty
of dcciding what laws have been enacted.
In Usener's case, the Court declared that although not in
duty bound to do so, yet it had nevertheless examined the
journals of the two Houses, with regard to the bill entitled
"An Act to adopt and establish a Penal Code and Code of
Criminal Procedure for the State of Texas," and arrived at
the conclusion that the Act had received the legislative
sanction in strict conformity with the Constitution, so that,
if driven to such examination, the Court was unhesitatingly
of opinion that there would be no difficulty in the way of
establishing that fact by them in every essential particular.
VoL. XXX-24
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It is insisted that the extent of the disregard of constitu-
tional requirements was not fully developed in that case, and
that its authority was overthrown by Hunt v. State (1886),
22 Tex. App. 396. But we are not called on to conclude
how this may be, or to anticipate the ultimate judgment of
the courts of Texas, if they consider the controversy still an
open one. If the question of the invalidity of the Codes
was presented to the District Court of Maverick County, it
must be assumed that it adjudged in favor of their validity;
and, as the case has been carried to the Court of Appeals,
that it will there be adjudicated in accordance with the law
of the State; and when so determined, it is entirely clear
that that adjudication could not be reviewed by the Circuit
Court or by us, on habeas cor5us. And the result must be
the same if the question has not been raised by the petitioner
in the State courts.
We may remark in conclusion that the magnitude of the
operation of the objection to these statutes does not affect
the principles by which the result is reached. This is not
the case of a system of laws attacked upon the ground of
their invalidity as the product of revolution. By the Con-
stitution, a republican form of government is guaranteed to
every State in the Union, and the distinguishing feature of
that form is the right of the people to choose their own
officers for governmental administration, and pass their own
laws in virtue of the legislative power reposed in representa-
tive bodies, whose legitimate acts may be said to be those of
the people themselves; but, while the people are thus the
source of political power, their governments, National and
State, have beeil limited by written Constitutions, and they
have themselves thereby set bounds to their own power, as
against the sudden impulses of mere majorities.
In Luther v. Borden (1849), 7 How. (48 U. S.) I, it was
held that the question which of the two opposing govern-
ments of Rhode Island, namely, the charter government or
the government established by a voluntary convention, was
the legitimate one, was a question for the determination of
the political department, and when that department had de-
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cided the courts were bound to take notice of the decision,
and follow it; and also that, as the Supreme Court of
Rhode Island, holding constitutional authority not in dis-
pute, had decided the point, the well-settled rule applied,
that the courts of the United States adopt and follow the
decisions of the State courts on questions which concern
merely the Constitution and laws of the State. Mr. Web-
ster's argument in that case took a wider sweep, and con-
tained a masterly statement of the American system of gov-
ernment, as recognizing that the people are the source of all
political power, but that, as the exercise of governmental
powers immediately by the people themselves is impracti-
cable, they must be exercised by representatives of the peo-
ple; that the basis of representation is suffrage; that the
right of suffrage must be protected and its exercise pre-
scribed by previous law, and the results ascertained by some
certain rule; that through its regulated exercise each man's
power tells in the constitution of the government and in
the enactment of laws; that the people limit themselves in
regard to the qualifications of electors and the qualifications
of the elected, and to" certain forms of the conduct of elec-
tions; that our liberty is the liberty secured by the regular
action of popular power, taking place and ascertained in
accordance with legal and authentic modes; and that the
Constitution and laws do not proceed on the ground of revo-
lution, or any right of revolution, but on the idea of results
achieved by orderly action under the authority of existing
governments, proceedings outside of which are not contem-
plated by our institutions: 6 Webster's Works, p. 217.
Discursive as are the views of petitioner's counsel, no
violation of these fundamental principles in this instance is
or could be suggested. The State of Texas is in full posses-
sion of its faculties as a member of the Union, and its legis-
lative, executive and judicial departments are peacefully
operating by the orderly and settled methods prescribed by
its fundamental law. Whether certain statutes have or have
not binding force, it is for the State to determine, and that
determination in itself involves no infraction of the Consti-
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tution of the United States, and raises no Federal question
giving the courts of the United States jurisdiction. We
cannot perceive that petitioner is being otherwise dealt with
than according to the law of the land.
The judgment of the Circuit Court is affirmed.
The rule (if rule it can be called)
that the Federal courts are governed
in their construction of State laws,
whether statutory, common or con-
stitutional, by the decisions of the
judicial tribunals of the State, was
first applied in kcfeen v. Delancy's
Lessees, &c. (1809), 5 Cranch (9 U.
S.) 22. In that case, the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania had con-
strued the words "justice of the
peace," to include a justice of the
Supreme Court. The Federal court
followed this construction, saying:
"Were this act of 1815 now, for
the first time, to be construed, the
opinion of this Court would cer-
tainly be that the deed was not
regularly proved. A justice of the
supreme court would not be deemed
a.justice of the county, and the
decision would be that the deed
was not properly proved, and
therefore not legally recorded.
But in construing the statutes of a
State on which land titles depend,
infinite mischief would ensue,
should this Court observe a differ-
ent rule from that which has been
long established in the State; and,
in this case, the Court cannot
doubt that the courts of Pennsyl-
vania consider a justice of the
supreme court is within the de-
scription of the act."
The rule was applied without
discussion in Polk v. Wendell (1815),
9 Cranch (13 U. S.) 87, and Thatcher
v.Powell (1821), 6WVheat. (19 U.S.)
119.
In Elmendorf v. Taylor (1825),
io Wheat. (23 U. S.) 152, Henry
Clay and Chancellor Bibb seem
to have argued the question as if
one of first impression, with the
result that the venerable Chief
Justice reaffirmed the rule, and
stated with his usual clearness and
cogency, the reasoning which sup-
ported it: "This course is founded
upon the principle, supposed to be
universally recognized, that the
judicial department of every gov-
ernment * * is the appropriate
organ for construing the legislative
acts of that government." En-
larging upon this general principle
of jurisprdcnce, he concludes:
"If, then, this question has been
settled in Kentucky, we must sup-
pose it to be rightly settled."
In Swigt v. Tyson (1842), 16
Peters (41 U. S.) I, Justice STORY,
who had concurred in Elmendorfv.
Taylor, ignored completely the
reasons announced in that case as
the basis of the rule and declared
that it found its authority in Sec-
tion 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789
(now 721, Rev. Stat. U. S.).
Standing upon this new foundation,
the Court said: "It has never been
supposed by us that the Section
did apply or was designed to apply
to questions of a more general na-
ture, not at all dependent upon
local statutes or usages of a fixed
and permanent operation, as, for
example, to the construction of or-
dinary contracts or other written
instruments and especially to ques-
tions of general commercial law,
where the State tribunals are called
upon to perform like functions as
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ourselves, that is, to ascertain, upon
general reasoning and legal analo-
gies what is the true exposition of
the contract or instrument, or what
is the just rule furnished by the
principles of commercial law to
govern the case." This novel
statement as to The origin of the
rule passed unchallenged by the as-
sociates of Justice STORY, most of
whom had participated in the
opinion in the Ehnendorf Case and
the exception thus introduced has
been affirmed in Carpenter v.
Providence & Ins. Co. (1842), I6
Pet. (41 U. S.) 495; Carroll v. Car-
roll's Lessee (1853), i6 How. (57 U.
S.), 275; Walson v. Tarpley (1855),
18 How. (59 U. S.) 517; Oates v.
Nat'lL'ank (187 9 ), 1o Otto (io U.
S.) 239 ; Brooklyn 6-c. R. R. Co. v.
Nat'l Bank (iSSo), 12 Otto (102 U.
S.) r4 ; Arorton v. Shelby Co. (i886),
118 U. S. 425, and seems to be too
firmly established to be drawn in
question.
This exception is an exceedingly
unfortunate one, introducing as it
does two kinds of law in the same
community, one administered by
the State courts, the other by the
Federal tribunals. Its reasoning is
squarely opposed to that found in
fackson v. Chew (1827), 12 Wheat.
(25 U. S.) 153; W1"ilcox v.
Hunt (1839), 13 Pet. (,38 U. S.) 378
(decided before Swi/t v. Tyson),
and Bucher v. R. R. (,888), 125 U.
S. 555. In the last case, the Court
adopted the Sunday law of Massa-
chusetts as a defense against an ac-
tion brought by a party who had
been injured while traveling on
Sunday, in violation of the Sunday
law.
The next exception is that the
Federal courts will not permit the
construction of the Constitution or
statutes of a State in such a way as
to disturb vested rights in contracts
protected by the Federal Constitu-
tion. This exception has been
brought into being almost entirely,
by the efforts of State legislat6rs to
withdraw from creditors the protec-
tion or assistance of laws existing
when the contracts were made.
Butz v. Aluscatine (1869), 8 Wall.
(75 U. S.) 575, is the leading case
under that head, followed in Walker
v. Whitehead (1873), 16 Wall. (83
U. S.) 314, the Virginia Copozon
Cases (1885), 114 U. S. 269, and re-
strained somewhat in Supervisors
v. U. S. (I867), 4 Wall. 71 U. S.)
435. When the subject of consid-
eration is a contract between
States, the rule does not apply:
Alarlall v. Silk (1837), 11 Pet. (36
U. S.) i; Jefferson Br. Bank v.
Skelly (1861), 1 Black (66 U. S.)4436.
It was held by the majority of the
Court in Williamson v. Berry
(i85o), 8 How. (49 U. S.) 495, that
the rule did not apply where the
act under construction was for the
benefit of a private party. The dis-
senting opinion by NE.SON, J.,
concurred in by the Chief Justice
and Justice CATRON-, strenuously
combatted this limitation as we
think with the better reason. Why
the Federal courts should be bound
by the exposition of the State
courts dealing with a law affecting
allwithin itsterritory and notwhen
one person only was interested, is
somewhat difficult of comprehen-
sion. The same title came back to
the Court in Suydam v. Williamson
(i86I), 24 How. (65 U. S.) 427, and
the Court, in an unanimous opin-
ion, disregarded the ground of the
former opinion and reversed the
trial court for following the last de-
liverance of the highest Federal
Court and declining to adopt in its
stead the decision of the State
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court. The opinion is an admir-
able example of the manner in
which the greatest tribunal in the
world reverses itself without seem-
ing to do so; as it were, in naive
unconsciousness of former con-
clusions. Dicta are neverbinding:
Carroll v. Carroll's Lessee (1853),
16 How. (57 U. S.) 275.
Burgess v. Seligman kiS83), 17
Otto (107 U. S.), 20, attempted to
establish the exception that where
contract rights have arisen under
statutory or constitutional provis-
ions which had not been construed
by the State tribunals, the Federal
courts are not bound to acquiesce
in subsequent determinations of the
State courts. This limitation upon
the rule has been carried to such
astonishing lengths that a few of
the cases maybe especially noticed.
In the Seligman Case, the question
was whether the defendants were
liable as stockholders for the debts
of a corporation, their exemption
from such liability arising directly
upon the construction of the Statute
of Missouri, regulating that subject.
BRADLEV, J., says: "The Federal
courts have an independent juris-
diction in the administration of
State laws, co-ordinate with, and
not subordinate to, that of the State
courts, and are bound to exercise
their ownjudgment as to the mean-
jng of and effect of those laws."
With this view of the relation of
the Federal courts to the States, he
proceeds to examine and reject, un-
hesitatingly, the construction which
the Supreme Court of a sovereign
State had put upon its own laws.
In Carroll Co. v. Snmt1h (IS84), III
U. S. 556, this departure was ap-
applied to the construction of the
Constitution of the State of Missis-
sippi, with a like result. There
the Supreme Court of the State had
held that certain provisions of the
Constitution of the State meant so
and so. The Federal Court declin-
ing to adopt that view, said:
"When therefore it [the decision
of the State court] is presented for
application by the courts of the
United States, in a litigation grow-
ing out of the same facts, of which
they have jurisdiction by reason of
the citizenship of the parties, the
plaintiff has a right, under the Con-
stitution of the United States, to
the independent judgment of those
courts, to determine for themselves
what is the law of the State, by
which his rights are fixed and gov-
erned." Olcollv. TheSupervisors,
supra, should be considered in this
connection. Here the courts of
Wisconsin had held that taxation
for a certain purpose was unconsti-
tutional, the purpose notbeing pub-
lic. The Federal Court declined to
admit as Chief Justice MARSHALL
did, "that the judicial department
of every government was the appro-
priate organ for construing the
legislative acts ofthat government ,"
or as was stated so clearly by the
same learned Judge, in Bank oJ
Hamilton v. Dudley's Lessee (1829),
2 Pet. (27 U. S.) 492: " The ju-
dicial depiartment of every govern-
ment is the rightfl ex-pcsilor of its
laws and empihalically of its su-
preme law."
In Beauregard v. City of Arew
Orleans (I856), IS How. (59 U. S.)
497, the predecessors of Justice
BRADLEY said: "They (i. e., the
Federal courts) administer the laws
of the State and to fulfill that duty
they must find them as they exist
in the habits of the people and in
the expositions of their constituted
authorities." In WJilcox v. Hunt
(0839), 13 Peters (38 U. S.) 378, the
Court speaking of the trial Federal
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court sitting in Louisiana, calls it,
in so many words, a court of that
State, saying that those who "go
into the courts of Louisiana must
take their chances there." In
Leflngwell v. Warren (1862), 2
Black (67 U. S.) 599, the Court
said the construction given to a
statute of a State by the highest
tribunal of such State, "is regarded
as a part of the statute and is as
binding upon the courts of the
United States asthe text" of it. If
the construction placed by the
courts of Wisconsin and Mississippi
upon their Constitutions becameII a
part of the text," then there was no
duty left the Federal courts but to
apply the plain unambiguous text
of those instruments.
These are the only recognized
limitations upon the rule under
consideration. There remains how-
ever, properly to be considered in
this connection, the attitude which
the Federal courts have assumed
when the decisions of a State court
have not remained consistent with
each other. Whether having once
adopted the construction of the
State courts, they are bound to
change with their changes and
whether, if the reversal be inter-
mediate, the trial in the inferior
Federal court and the hearing of
the appeal, it shall be reversed be-
cause not in accord with subse-
quent State decision, are questions
which have arisen not a few times.
As to the inquiry whether the Fed-
eral courts have once adopted the
decision of the State courts, shall
change with their changes, Green
v. -ANeal's Lessee (1832), 6 Pet. (31
U. S.) 291, is perhaps the best con-
sidered case. The reasons which
led to the adoption of the decision
of the State courts in the first in-
stance are there declared to be
equally cogent in favor of conform-
ing to the altered views of the State
authorities, and this view led, in
that case, to the overruling of the
former decisions (Patton's Lessee v.
Easton, i816, I Wheat., 14 U. S.,
476, and Powell'sLesseev. Harmen,
1829, 2 Pet., 27 U. S., 241), which
rested upon earlier decisions of the
Supreme Court of Tennessee, and
the reversal of the Circuit Court
for adhering to those decisions.
This determination was, however,
expressly made with reference,
" not to a single adjudication but to
a series of decisions, which shall
settle the rule." Pease v. Peck
(1856), iS How. (s9 U. S.) 595,
found the same Court when it had
first decided a question, declining
to surrender its convictions on ac-
count of a subsequent decision to
the contrary by the State courts.
MIorgan v. Curlenius (1859), 2o
How. (61 U. S.) i, affirmed the de-
cision appealed from, although be-
tween the trial in the Circuit Court
and the hearing on appeal, the Su-
preme Court of Illinois had over-
ruled the very case on which the
trial court rested its conclusion, the
reason given being that the later
decision of the Supreme Court of
the State could not "make that er-
roneous wvh ich was tot so when the
judgment of the court was give,.."
Almost thirty years before, in U. S.
v. Morrison (83o), 4 Pet. (29 U. S.)
124, the Federal Circuit Cotrt va
reversed upon the sole ground that
the Supreme Court of the State had
subsequently held otherwise ; while
in M7oores v. Arat'l Bank (iSSi), 14
Otto (Io4 U. S.) 625, the Circuit
Court was again reversed upon the
express ground that the trial court
erred in its jtdmnenl, because the
S. Areme Courl ofthe S/ate had sub-
sequently construed the statute dif-
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ferently. In the last case, the Court
declined to examine the question
independently at all and reversed it
solely on the strength of the subse-
quent decision of the Supreme
Court of Ohio.
In the Morgan Case, supra, the
Court examined for itself the posi-
tion taken by the trial court, and
finding it conform to their views,
they declined to say it was erroneous
because the highest tribunal of the
State, charged with the duty of con-
struing the laws of the State, had
held otherwise. Rowan v. Runnels
(1847), 5 How. (46 U. S.) 34, is
another instance of construing the
statutes of a State independently of
its tribunals. Having, as we have
seen in lVilliamson v. Berry, sup ra,
declined to follow the State courtat
all, when the self same title came
before them in Suydam v. WVilliam-
son (I86x), 24 How. (65 U. S.) 427,
the Court held itself concluded by a
single adjudication of the State
Supreme Court, thus ignoring the
emphatic statement in Green v.
Neal's Lessee (1832), 6 Pet. (31 TT.
S.) 291, thatit would not "follow a
sing.'e adjudication but a series of
them." These cases indicate with
sufficient clearness the want of har-
mony in the decisions of the high-
est Federal tribunal on this branch
of the subject. They are absolutely
irreconcilable. I submit with all
proper deference that neither the
rule or its exceptions can be said to
be settled.
The tone of the modern de-
cisions differs essentially from that
of the earlier. In the later cases
the binding force of State decis-
ions is not stated in the plain
language of the earlier opinions.
Hanrick v. Patrick (1886), ii U.
S. 156, states the rule thus: "Great
weight, if not conclusive effect, is
to be given to these decisions of the
Supreme Court of Texas." Ateri-
welher v. JIfuhlenburg Co. (1887),
120 U. S. 354, speaks thus ofthede-
cisions of the Supreme Court of
Kentucky on a question of the or.
ganization and composition of a
tribunal of the State: "Those de-
cisions are at least entitled to great
weight." There is a wide chasm
between decisions which are conclu-
sive and not to be re-examined, and
those which.are entitled to great
weight. Therewill beno harmony
as to this rule, or its limitations,
until the relations of the Federal
courts to the States whose laws they
are administering, are more clearly
defined. If they are (in the State
where they sit) courts of the State
applying its laws, then they must
of course take those laws as con-
strued and applied by the highest
tribunal of such State. To do
otherwise is to destroy all stability
and certainty in the administration
ofjustice. The fact that diversity
of citizenship gives them jurisdic-
tion does notaffect this rule. Juris-
diction is not conferred upon the
Federal courts in controversies be-
tween citizens of different States to
protect the non-resident from the
operation and effect of the laws of
the State, but solely to insure to
him, in every State, those con-
tractual rights and remedies which
the citizens thereof enjoy. When
citizens of different States enter
into contracts, they do so in some
State, the contracts are to be per-
formed in some State, and the trial
court, whether Federal or State,
must apply the appropriate law of
the place of contract or of the place
of performance. The citizen of
New York who makes a contract
with a citizen of Ohio, to be per-
formed in either, or neither State,
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